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Abstract
The literature on patent protection assumes a so-cailed "fencepost" system, in
which there would be no need to refer to the courts over questions of interpretation. In
reality, we observe a myriad of patent infringement suits through which questions of
utility, novelty, and nonobviousness are independently ruled on by a court. Therefore,
patent litigation accompanying initial imitations can reveal important information about the
validity of the contested patents for other potential entrants. This paper explores the
implications of such information revelation through patent litigation. It is shown that the
payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are highly discontinuous in the degree of
patent protection. Furthermore, strengthening intellectual property rights is not
necessarily desirable for the patentee. The analysis also has implications for interpreting
empirical data on imitation lags.
I. Introduction
This paper explores the implications of patent infringement litigation for the overall
patent system. More specifically, I focus on the role of patent suits in conveying
information regarding the validity and enforceability of the patents in dispute. It will be
shown that the incorporation of patent litigation into the process of patent enforcement
generates a rich set of predictions for the imitation-based entry dynamics, especially when
there are multiple potential entrants. These results can have further implications for the
interpretation of empirical data on imitation and the incentive to innovate.
Recognizing that knowledge is inherently a public good, the patent system
purports to confer perfect appropriability by granting legal monopoly of an invention (for
a limited time) to restore the incentive to engage in innovative activity. This idealization
underlies most of the theoretical work concerning the economics of innovation and
patents [Arrow (1962), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Nordhaus (1969), etc.].
Empirical studies, however, revealed that patent is not perfect and that imitation is
a common occurrence [Mansfield et al. (1981) and Levin et aL (1987)]. Subsequently,
the possibility of imitating or "inventing around" the patent has been formally incorporated
into theoretical models [Benoit (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1987), Dasgupta (1988), and
Gallini (1992)]. All these papers, despite making advances over the previous literature in
that they account for empirical facts, still retain the assumption that the interpretation of
the patent scope is exact and, as a result, there is no need to refer to the courts over
questions of interpretation; in the jargon of the legal literature on patents, the literature on
patent protection assumes a so-called strict "fencepost" system.1 This assumption is
typified in the recent literature on the tradeoff between the patent scope and the patent
length [Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990)]. In Klemperer's (1990)
analysis, for instance, a patent's breadth measures how different competitors' products
should be in order not to infringe on the patent. To this end, a notion of distance is
Notable exceptions are Meurer (1989) and Waterson (1990), which will be discussed below.
introduced in his formulation of patent scope: a patent of width co prevents competing
firms from producing product varieties within a distance co from the patentholder's product
in horizontal product space. An implicit assumption in his analysis is that this distance is
well-defined for all relevant participants and, consequently, there is no ambiguity regarding
the occurrence of infringement.
In reality, however, the scope of patent is determined by both statutory authority
and judicial interpretation; issuance of the patent does no more than confer a patent right
that is "presumed" valid (35 U.S.C.A. 282).2 Uncertainty as to the validity and coverage
of many patents makes disputes inevitable.3 Consequently, we observe a myriad of patent
infringement suits through which questions of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness are
independently ruled on by a court.4 To illustrate the importance of court decisions on
patent validity in infringement suits, I point out that of the 294 patents contested in all
federal appellate court between 1966 and 1971, only 89 (about 30 %) were found valid
(Kintner and Lahr, 1975). Therefore, patent litigation accompanying initial imitations can
reveal important information about the validity of the contested patents for other potential
entrants.5 This paper explores the implications of information revelation through patent
litigation. It is shown that the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are highly
discontinuous in the degree of patent protection. Furthermore, strengthening intellectual
property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee.
The paper considers an imitation decision by potential entrants and the incumbent
(patentee)'s response to entry via a potential patent infringement suit. The novelty of the
paper comes from considering multiple potential entrants with endogenous entry timing.
The basic premise of the paper is an observation that the outcome of a patent suit, i.e.,
issuance does not guarantee validity. In this respect, a patent is nothing but the title to sue.
3
 Some legal commentators characterize a patent as an invitation to a law suit or a lottery ticket (Kitti,
1979).
4See Scotchmer and Green (1990) and Scotchmer (1991) for an economic analysis of novelty requirement
in a model of sequential innovations.
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 Alternatively, we may assume that uncertainty lies in the amount of royalty payments the court decides
that the patentee is entitled to.
how the court will interpret the law, is inherently uncertain for both the patentee and the
accused infringer. For instance, the "doctrine of equivalents" entitles the patented
invention to cover a certain range of equivalents. However, the exact boundary of the
equivalents is impossible to draw. The matter of infringement can be reasonably assumed
to be decided case by case. This point has an important implication especially when there
are multiple potential entrants. The reason is that an initial imitation attempt and its
corresponding suit can reveal important information regarding the validity of the patent
through the litigation process.
This information revelation can have an impact on the behavior of both the
patentee and the potential imitators. First of all, if the imitated patent is held invalid and
the patent is revoked, it clears the deck for other potential entrants, making further entry
immune from the threat of a suit. Even though an early entrant can benefit from an
additional profit until other firms enter, I expect that this potential gain can be easily
outweighed by the potential saving of sunk entry costs; it may be better to be a second
imitator since it can save fixed sunk costs of entry in case of patent infringement. This
creates an incentive to free ride on information provided by an early imitator. The
consequence is a possibility of a waiting game in the imitation process.6
For the patentee, it implies that the infringement suit is a risky business to conduct.
If her patent is revoked in the suit, it will facilitate further entry to the industry. This
implies that the incentive to bring up a suit increases with the number of entrants already
in the market since the adverse effect of further entry gets smaller. As a result, I find a set
of parameters, which I call the limit entry set, where an initial entry occurs without any
patent suit while further entry is deterred. In this set, the patentee initially refrains from
bringing up the suit since the potential negative effect of information revelation outweighs
6In the innovation literature, it has been recognized that the possibility of imitation can convert the
innovation game from a race to a waiting game [Dasgupta (1988) and Katz and Shapiro (1987)].
However, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first one to point out the possibility of a waiting
game in the imitation game ex post innovation.
the potential positive effect of restraining competition whereas the second entry is deterred
since it will trigger a patent suit. In this case, the imitation game is a preemption game in
which each potential entrant strives to be the first one to imitate, knowing that he will be
accommodated without inviting further entry. The existence of the limit entry set can have
a dramatic effect on the overall behavior of profit functions for the patentee and potential
imitators. It is shown that the payoffs for the patentee and the initial imitator are highly
discontinuous in the extent of patent protection. Furthermore, strengthening intellectual
property rights is not necessarily desirable for the patentee.
This paper relates closely to the imitation literature. Katz and Shapiro (1987)
Dasgupta (1988) formally consider the possibility of imitation in the patent race.7 Gallini
(1992) improves on the previous papers by assuming costly imitation. Thereby, she
endogenizes the decision to imitate through its dependence on the length and scope of
patent protection. Contrary to the results of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer
(1990), she finds that in the presence of imitation costs, the optimal patent policy involves
a broad scope of patent and a short patent life. Interestingly, as in my paper, she finds that
an increase in patent life over some range may have no effect on or, paradoxically, may
reduce the incentive to innovate. However, the mechanism through which this result is
induced is completely different; in her analysis, increasing patent life increases the number
of competing products via a zero profit entry condition while my analysis resorts to the
change in the entry timing. Benoit (1985) is closest to this paper in that the effect of
imitation on the innovator is generated through endogenized entry timing of the imitator.
In his paper, there is uncertainty surrounding the profitability of innovation, which is
revealed only over time. This creates an option value of waiting for the imitator; even
though the waiting strategy entails the loss of temporary profits in the event the
7
 A recent paper by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) considers the process of technology diffusion in a
competitive industry when a fixed number of firms reduces costs via two channels: innovating themselves
or imitating their rivals' technologies.
innovation is favorable, it can save on a would-be failed investment.8 In contrast, the
endogenized timing of entry in my paper arises from strategic interaction between multiple
imitators trying either to free ride on information or to preempt each other. As pointed
out earlier, all these papers assume that either imitation is immune from infringement or
innovation is nonpatentable. Therefore their framework is not adequate to analyze the
issues we are interested in, i.e., the information revelation role of the patent suit.
Meurer (1989) and Waterson (1990) are notable exceptions in that their models
incorporate a fully structured legal process in which a "signpost" system of patents is
assumed.9 As in this paper, they consider uncertainty about the extent of protection a
patent provides. The foci of their analyses, however, are quite different: Meurer's
concern is on patent licensing that is induced as part of a settlement agreement to avoid
litigation regarding patent validity whereas Waterson's main contribution lies in exploring
issues regarding the effects of patents on product variety selection. Both of their models
contain a single entrant and, consequently, the issue of information revelation does not
arise.
In focusing on the information revelation aspect of patent litigation, this paper is
somewhat related to Horstman et al.(1985). They assume that an innovating firm has
private information regarding the profitability of imitation. As a result, in their model the
decision to patent has the potential to reveal implicitly some of the innovator's information
to the competitor. In contrast, my analysis assumes a symmetric information structure
between the patentee and the imitators since they are assumed to share or entertain the
same assessment regarding the probability of infringement. The effect of information
revelation arises only through further entry by a third party.
8Benoit's model also predicts the nonmonotonicity of innovator's profit in relevant parameters (cost of
innovation and probability of success) if imitation is possible.
9In the "fencepost" interpretation of patent specifications, the perimeter of the patentee's claims is
assumed to be clearly marked out The "signpost" interpretation regards the patent specification as merely
pointing the reader in the direction which he may not travel without a license.
Finally, in terms of the overall dynamics of entry, the paper is similar to Bernheim
(1984). He argues that when there is a sequence of potential entrants, the qualitative
nature of the entry deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms is much different
from the single entrant case. In particular, the sequential aspects of entry deterrence
makes it possible that government policies designed to promote entry have the opposite
effect of increasing industrial concentration. The reason is that the profitability of
potential entrants is in turn determined in part by the ease with which future entrants can
be deterred. However, as will be explained later, the underlying mechanisms through
which entry dynamics are generated are quite different across the two models.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In section II, I
provide a basic two-period model in which the order of entry is exogenously fixed. Also,
the informational externalities provided by the first entrant is discussed. In section III, I
extend the basic model by allowing the timing of entry to be endogenously determined in
an infinite horizon framework. It is shown that the nature of the entry game can be either
one of waiting or preemption depending on the degree of patent protection. One
important consequence is that, contrary to intuition, strengthening the patent protection
can be harmful for the patentee as the entry game is changed from a waiting game to a
preemption game. Section IV concludes with a discussion of possible extensions and
limitations of the model.
II. The Basic Model
I consider a simple model of sequential entry. There is an incumbent who has a
patent for a new product or process. He faces a sequence of potential entrants. In each
period there is one potential entrant who can enter the market by imitating the patented
product. Once there is an entry by an imitator, the incumbent (patentee) can take the
entrant to court for patent infringement. The entry involves a sunk cost of F. This sunk
cost can be interpreted as a cost of imitation as in Gallini (1992) or as a fixed setup cost of
tooling up necessary for a new product.
Contrary to most of the previous literature, the central feature of the present paper
is that the extent to which protection is provided by the patent is not precise, and even the
validity of the patent itself can be challenged in court. One important consequence of
incorporating this feature into the patent enforcement mechanism is that the process of
imitation and its accompanying patent litigation has a characteristic of a public good if
there are multiple potential entrants; an early entrant can provide a valuable piece of
information since the outcome of a patent suit reveals the profitability of entry for those
who wait in the wings. This information is valuable since entry involves a sunk cost,
which can be saved if the court deems an imitation product to infringe the patent.
I analyze the simplest model that is capable of addressing the issue of informational
externalities among potential entrants. I consider a two-period model. There are two
potential entrants, which is the smallest number allowing one to meaningfully analyze
information transmission.10 In order to abstract from the strategic choice of entry timing,
I assume that the order of entry is predetermined. The next section relaxes this
assumption in an infinite horizon framework. The uncertainty of the outcome of a patent
suit is captured by a probability a that the patentee prevails in the suit, which is assumed
to be known and shared by both parties.11
The order of decisions and payoffs are summarized in Figure 1. At the beginning
of the first period, the first entrant decides whether or not to enter. If he decides not to
enter, the incumbent will be a monopolist for the first period. If he decides to enter, he
10In a survey study of Levin et al. (1987), most respondents believed only a few firms (three to five for a
major innovation, six to ten for a typical innovation) were capable of duplicating new processes and
products.
11
 It is possible that the patentee has better information regarding this probability since she may know the
potential weakness of the patent (Meurer, 1989). In this case, the mere decision to bring a suit can have
informational content especially when out-of-court settlement is possible. This is an important agenda for
future research. See Horstmann et al. (1985) for an analysis where the decision to patent can have a
similar information-revealing effect.
has to sink a fixed cost of F. Let the profits for the monopoly, duopoly, and triopoly per
period be denoted by n M , n D , and It1", respectively, where n M > n D >nT . With this
notation, we implicitly assume that those profits are symmetric between the incumbent and
entrants. Since the imitated product can be inferior or superior to the original patented
product, duopoly and triopoly profits need not to be the same across the patentee and
imitators. This assumption is only for the sake of saving notation and has no
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Figure 1 - The Order of Decisions and Pavoffs: I, El, E2, and C denote Incumbent,
Entrant 1, Entrant 2, and the Court, respectively. The payoffs vectors list final payoffs
for I, El, and E2 in that order. The subtree corresponding to the second period is
collapsed reflecting the fact that litigation is a dominant strategy for the incumbent in the
second period since there is no further entry even though she loses in the suit.
To make the analysis interesting, we maintain the following assumption throughout
the paper.12
n T - F > 0 (1)
The assumption assures that if there is no danger of infringement it is profitable to enter
the industry as a triopolist. Otherwise, the market can accommodate at most two firms
and the issue of information transmission does not arise.
In the face of entry, the incumbent can accommodate the entrant by sharing the
market or take the entrant to court for patent infringement. For simplicity, I assume that
there is only one way to imitate and the probability that the entrant is deemed to infringe
on the patent is given by a. This probability is known to both the incumbent and potential
entrants. To focus on my main topic of interest, namely the information revelation aspect
of patent suits, I assume away any legal costs involved in the litigation process.13 For
simplicity I also assume that the outcome of the suit is determined immediately.14 There
are two possible outcomes of the patent suit. If the entrant is found to infringe on the
patent, a court injunction will prohibit the selling of the imitation product and,
consequently, the entrant should leave the industry, forfeiting the entry cost of F. In this
case, the incumbent will remain a monopolist for the period. Another possible outcome
of the suit is that the patent is deemed as invalid.15 If this is the case, the market will be
occupied by two firms in the first period.
12The corresponding assumption in the infinite horizon model of section III is nT/(l-6) - F > 0.
13In Meurer's (1989) model, the incentive to avoid legal costs plays a crucial role to the settlement process
of patent litigation. Meurer's and my papers, however, should be viewed as complementary rather than
competing because they highlight different aspects of patent litigation.
14In reality, few patent disputes are finally settled within three years (White and Jacob, 1986). In the case
of Polaroid v. Kodak in which Polaroid received $985 million as a settlement, it took 14 years for the
patent infringement suit to be resolved. One important topic for future research is to incorporate this
empirical fact into the model.
15
 Another possibility, which I ignore, is the case in which the patent is valid but the claims of the patent
specification are too narrow to cover the article the entrant is producing. In this case, everyone in the
industry now knows how to get around it. Therefore, as will be clear, for my purposes this possibility can
be ignored without any loss of generality since this case is equivalent to the case where the patent is found
to be invalid.
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The main focus of this paper is the implication of the patent suit for the other
entrant in period 2. At the beginning of the second period, another potential entrant
arrives on the scene and makes his own decision regarding entry. He is assumed to have
observed what has happened in the first period. Particularly, the outcome of the patent
suit, if there was one, is known to him. There are four possible subgames facing the
second potential entrant: (i) there was an entry and a suit in which the patent was held
invalid, (ii) there was entry and an infringement suit in which the patentee prevailed, (iii)
there was entry but it was accommodated by the patentee, and (iv) there was no entry in
the first period.
If the second entrant decides to enter, there may be another infringement suit by
the patentee. However, for simplicity, I make the following observations/assumptions
regarding the litigation process. If the patent is invalid, there is no patent and the other
entrant can enter the market without the fear of being sued.16 If the patentee prevails in
the first period, on the other hand, her competitors are assumed to respect the patent in
the future even though theoretically they can challenge it again.17 This assumption could
be relaxed without affecting the main results of the paper as long as other potential
imitators update their beliefs in a way that reduces the expected value of imitation.18
Finally, I assume that if the patentee accommodates the initial imitator in the first period,
she cannot charge him with patent infringement in the second period. I make this
assumption by invoking the so-called "laches estoppel and the statute of limitations." This
16This doctrine is called collateral estoppel which states that a patent owner is precluded "from asserting a
charge of infringement if the patent has already been found invalid in earlier litigation involving its owner
and a different accused infringer (Kintner and Lahr, 1975)."
17In this respect, however, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not work in reverse. "An owner whose
patent has been found valid in an initial suit against one infringer may not thereafter avoid relitigation of
the validity of the patent in a subsequent suit against another infringer (Kintner and Lahr, 1975)."
l8For instance, in the United Kingdom legal system, if the patent is held valid, the patentee receives a
"certificate of contested validity." Even though we abstract away from the legal costs in this paper, the
effect of a certificate is to enable the patentee to recover the actual legal costs ("solicitor and own client
costs") incurred if she wins another action on that patent, which makes the challenge more expensive for
potential imitators. For an initial patent suit, the patentee is allowed to ask for only the least amount it
would be possible to spend in fighting the action ("party and party costs"). The difference can be very
large for a patent action. See White and Jacob (1986) for details.
is a special case of equitable estoppel which applies because of the patentee owner's earlier
inaction. The purpose of this rule is to prevent a patentee from enforcing her patent
against a party for infringement because she "slept on [her] rights while the infringer made
expenditures in the belief that he was not infringing the patent or that, if infringing, he
would not be sued [Kintner and Lahr (1975)]."19 However, delay in proceeding against
the first imitator is no ground for refusing an injunction, if there has been no delay in
proceeding against the second imitator. Therefore, the patentee can proceed against the
second imitator even though she accommodated the first imitator and relinquished her
rights for the remedy against the first imitator {Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Warrilow, 13
R.P.C. 284).20
Under these assumptions, note that it is a dominant strategy for the incumbent to
sue any entrant in the second period since the incumbent can only gain by suing with no
legal costs. Suing in the first period, on the other hand, carries with it a serious risk for
the patentee in since it can facilitate further entry in the second period in case she loses.
Now let me analyze the game by using a standard backward induction argument.
Suppose that there were an entry and a subsequent patent infringement suit in the first
period. The second entrant will decide to enter depending on the outcome of the suit; he
enters if and only if the patent is deemed to be invalid. Suppose that there has been no
patent suit brought by the patentee after an entry in the previous period. Then, the
second entrant should decide to enter under uncertainty about the outcome of patent suit.
Given that it is a dominant strategy for the incumbent to file a suit in the second period, he
will enter if and only if
( l - a ) n T - F > 0 2 1 (2)
l9In North British Rubber Co. v. Gormully and Jeffrey Co. (R.S.C., Ord. 8, r.4.), Judge Chitty ruled that
"the general rule of the court is that a person who comes to ask for that remedy,..., should come
promptly."
20See also Aldous et al. (1982).
21In case of no entry in the first period, he will enter if and only if ( l - a )n D - F > 0. In equilibrium,
however, there can be entry in the second period only if there has been a prior entry in the first period.
The reason is that the first entrant has a bigger incentive to enter due to a longer horizon (see Eq. (7)). In
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Now let us analyze the decision for the patentee in case of entry in the first period.
If she brings an infringement suit, her expected payoff is given by:
w s = a(nM + snM) + (i-a) (nD + 6nT) (3)
If she prevails in the suit, she will have monopoly profit in both periods since she can deter
entry in the second period. If she loses, she will have duopoly profit in the first period and
triopoly profit in the second period due to further entry. The discount factor 8 reflects the
relative length of the first and second period. Consequently, we do not make any
presumption on the magnitude of 5; it need not be less than 1 if the time horizon after the
second entry is sufficiently long compared to the length of the first period which is meant
to be a time lapse between the first and second entry.
If she does not sue, she will have a duopoly profit in the first period. The profit in
the second period depends on the entry configuration. Let a2* be defined by22:
( l - a 2 * ) n T - F = 0 (4)
If a >a2*, i.e., condition (2) is violated, there will be no further entry and she will have a
duopoly profit. If a <(X2*, i.e., condition (2) is satisfied, then there will be entry and there
will be a suit in the second period. In this case, the second-period expected profit for the
incumbent will be aUP + (l-a)nT .2 3 I can write the expected payoff of accommodating
entry in the first period as:
WA = n D + 8 [ a n D + ( l - a ) ^ ] if a <a2*
IID + S n D i f a>a 2 * (5)
If I rewrite Eq. (3) as Ws = [aIIM + (l-a)IlD]+ 8 [ a n M + ( l -a)nT ] , it is
immediate that W§ >WA if a <a2* ; there is no adversary effect of information revelation
associated with the patent infringement suit since there will be further entry anyway in the
other words, whenever the condition ( l - a )n D - F > 0 is satisfied, the first entrant also have incentive to
enter the market
22The subscript of a refers to the firm for which the critical value is relevant in order to make an entry
decision.
23Note that I assume that the first entrant, who has already been accommodated, cannot be sued in the
second period via laches estoppel.
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second period. If a >a2*, the condition for accommodation to be a preferred strategy for
the patentee is given by a<a**, where a** e(0,l) is uniquely defined by:
[ a n M + (1 -a)nD]+ 5 [ a n M + (1 -a)n T ] = n D + 5 n D (6)
There are two cases to consider depending on the relative magnitude of ot2* and
Case I. ct2*>a**.
In this case, Wg >WA for all a e(0,l), implying that the incumbent patentee will
always bring an infringement suit in the face of initial entry. As long as there is entry in
the first period in equilibrium (i.e., a is not too high to make the infringement highly
likely), the model has predicted properties regarding each player's payoffs: The
incumbent's profit is continuous and strictly increasing in a and potential imitators' profits
are continuous and strictly decreasing in a.
Case II. a2*<a**.
In this case, there exists a set of parameter I = [ot2*, a**], which I will call the
"limit entry set." If a belongs to L, the first entry will be accommodated and there will be
no further entry in the second period: a is sufficiently high to deter further entry in the
second period (i.e., a ^a2*), whereas it is too low for the incumbent to engage in a risky
suit in the first period (i.e., a <a**).24 The presence of the limit entry set generates
interesting dynamics and produces many counter-intuitive predictions regarding the
payoffs of the players. Since the analysis of Case I is rather trivial, hereafter I focus only
on Case II to prevent the paper from becoming too lengthy.
Finally, to characterize the first entrant's decision, we need another critical value,
ai*, which is defined by
" - F = 0 (7)
241, can be also called the "live-and-let-live" set.
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The first entrant is indifferent between entering and staying out at the critical value a j *
assuming that the entry is responded to by an infringement suit. Note that a j * >oc2*
implying that the first entrant has a bigger incentive to enter due to a longer horizon. The
following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the imitation game.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists a limit entry set I = [0C2*, a**]. Let a# =
max(ai*, a**). (i)If a<a#, firm 1 enters the market in period 1. Confronted with an
entry, the incumbent accommodates the entry and there is no further entry if a e I.
(When a# = a** > a j * and a e ( a | * , a * * ) there will be no entry in the first period if the
incumbent were able to commit to bringing an infringement suit. However, this threat is
not credible and consequently, there will be an entry.) Otherwise (i.e., if a e(0,a#] - /.),
she brings an infringement suit. Depending on the outcome of the suit, there may be
further entry in period 2; firm 2 enters if and only if the patent is held invalid, (ii) If a>a#,
there is no entry in either period. The expected equilibrium payoffs as a function of a are
shown in Figure 2 (assuming a^* > a**).
As can be seen in Figure 2, the payoffs for each player are discontinuous at the
boundary of the limit entry set and constant within the set. Moreover, the imitators'
payoffs need not be decreasing as the degree of patent protection, parametrized by a,
strengthens. As a increases and passes through the limit set, we have a fundamental
change in the regimes. Despite this fact, the patentee's expected payoff is a weakly
increasing function of a. The reason is that the patentee always has the option of suing in
the limit entry set. Moreover, the first entrant's behavior is not affected as a crosses the
boundary of the limit entry set. However, this invariance of the first entrant's behavior is
due to the artificial assumption of exogenous entry timing. In the next section, it will be
shown that if the timing of entry is endogenized, an increase in a can have a perverse
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Figure 2 - The Expected Pavoffs of the Incumbent and Entrants as Functions of a.
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III. Endogenous Entry Timing in an Infinite Horizon Model
In this section, I relax the artificial assumption of exogenous entry timing. As
before, there are two potential entrants indexed by i=l,2 who can now enter at any time
they desire if they have not yet entered. Entry decisions are made only at the beginning of
each period which lasts for A. In each period, if there is any entry, the patentee can
respond with a patent suit if she chooses to. As before, per-period payoffs for
monopolist, duopolist and triopolist are denoted by n M , n D , and n T , respectively. The
discount factor is given by 5 = exp(-rA), where r is the rate of interest. Once again, I
assume that the legal principle of "laches estoppel" prevents the patentee from suing if she
does not bring up the suit immediately after imitation. I now analyze the entry game by
two potential entrants as a simple stopping game in an infinite horizon model in which the
decision for each firm is an entry timing.
In light of the results in the previous section, define the limit entry set, I = [a2*,
a**], which corresponds to the infinite horizon.25 The boundary of the limit entry set,





O-cc**) nD+5 1 - 5 1 - 5 (6)'
Once again, to ensure that I is not empty, assume that cc**>oc2*.
A. Waiting Game Regime
Now suppose that a e ^ ( = (0,1) - /), i.e., the best response of the patentee facing
an initial entry is to counter with an infringement suit. In this case, the expected payoff of
the first imitator who enters in period t can be written as:
25Once again, subscript 2 refers to the second entrant. In contrast to the previous section, the order of





If one firm enters in period t, the other firm can receive information regarding the
infringement of the patent, which allows the latter's entry decision to be conditioned on the
outcome of the suit. Therefore, the follower's expected payoff is




If both firms enter in the same period, we know that it is a dominant strategy for the
patentee to sue since there is no further entry to be concerned about. Therefore, the
expected payoff of both entrants can be written as
• r - l (1 -a ) 1-5 \-F
To make the initial entry feasible (L(t)> 0), assume that a
(10)
e
, which is defined by
v 1 —5y
The game is stationary before any entry and has a unique symmetric equilibrium,
which is also stationary. Since we are interested in the case where delta is short, it is easy
to verify that the game exhibits the payoff structure of a waiting game. The equilibrium is
characterized by mixed strategies in which each potential entrant enters with probability p
in each period if no player has entered before.26 For the stationary symmetric profile (p,p)
to be an equilibrium, a firm should be indifferent to entering now and waiting for one more
period. When the other player enters with probability p, the value of entering is given by
VE(p) = p (1 -a )









where V is the equilibrium value of playing the imitation game.
26There are also two asymmetric stationary equilibria: one is that firm l's strategy is "always enter" and
player 2's is "never enter"; the other is one in which the roles of firms are reversed.
IX
The equilibrium probability of adoption p*e(0,l) will be chosen so that VE(p*) =
Vw(p*) = V. Since we are interested in the results as A ->0, it is convenient to
approximate the waiting game in a continuous-time formulation. Then, the discount factor
(5 = exp(-rA)) reflects the time lapse between periods. We now interpret n M , n D , and FT
T
 as flow profits for monopoly, duopoly and triopoly, respectively.
With the continuous time formulation, let G(t) denote the cumulative probability
that firm i enters the market at or before t. For G to be a stationary symmetric
equilibrium, it is necessary that the players be indifferent to entering at time t and waiting
until t + dt to take advantage of the informational revelation created by the other entrant.
Conditional on not entering before t, the marginal cost of waiting is approximated, to the
first order of dt, as [(l-a)l lT - rF] dt. By waiting, one loses flow profit proportional to
dt in case the patent is held invalid which occurs with probability of (1-a). Since a
successful entry will be followed by another entrant immediately (A —»0), the relevant
profit is a triopoly profit. The second term (rF) in the square bracket is a cost saving
from a deferred entry. The expected reward from waiting comes from the avoidance of
fixed cost when the imitation is found to infringe the patent, which is ocF dG.




Then, the equilibrium strategies are characterized as an exponential distribution with a
»« (1 - a)TlT - rF - , , - . , . . .
parameter of A =- . Let / denote the first entry time which is random.
aF
Then, the incumbent has a monopoly profit until t , thereafter her expected payoff is a
triopoly profit:
27It can be formally demonstrated that this equilibrium in continuous strategies is the limit of the
equilibrium of the corresponding game in discrete time as A goes to zero. To make the discrete- and
continuous-time formulations comparable, we have to assume that the profits for monopolist, duopolist.
and triopolist are n M , n D , and n T per unit of real time, respectively. For instance, the monopoly profit
in discrete time with period length of A is n M A. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for details.
rKi
It is well-known that
2X






By definition of a2*, we have that A.—M) as a —HX2*-.28 Consequently, the expected
payoff for the incumbent approaches the monopoly profit ITM/r as a
B. Preemption Game Regime
Now, suppose that QLGI . For this parameter region, if in period t there is only
one entrant, he will be accommodated whereas further entry will be deterred. Therefore,
the expected payoff of the first player who enters in period t can be written as :
The other player refrains from entering further and gets zero. If both potential entrants
enter in the same period t, the expected payoffs of both players are given by Eq. (10) as
before.
The game is one of preemption in which each firm strives to be the first entrant
knowing that he will be accommodated without further entry. The game has a unique
symmetric equilibrium. In each period, if no entry has yet occurred, each player enters
the market with probability p which is given by:
The expected payoffs of both players are zero. The reason is that there is a positive
probability of coordination failure: both enter in the same period and lose B(t) which is
28Let x -> y+ (y-) denote that x approaches y through values greater (smaller) than y.
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negative when a e i . Note that dp/da<0. The reason is that potential entrants become
more cautious in their entry decision as the cost of mistakes for them increases with a.
The continuous time formulation of the preemption game involves a subtlety that is
not present in the waiting game since the formalization that is applied to a waiting game
"entails a 'loss of information1 in passing from discrete time with short periods to the
continuous time limit" [see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for a new formulation that allows
a continuous-time representation of the limits of discrete-time counterparts and
discussions therein].29 However, for our purposes, I need not delve into these
technicalities. Let it suffice to mention the following features of the equilibrium as A -»0:
First, the entry game ends with probability 1 at time zero. Second, let P denote the
limiting value of the coordination failure. Then, we can write the expected payoff of the
patentee as:
r
Note that P = p/(2-p), which is decreasing in a:
<0 (20)
da ty da
Increased a reduces the probability of entry in every period for each entrant, which in turn
reduces the probability of coordination failure (simultaneous entry).
Within the limit entry set, we can verify that the patented expected payoff increases
as a increases.30
a^ c/pf[an"+(i-a)nr]-n°|| (n"-rr)^
da dial r j r
First, as a increases, the probability of coordination failure decreases (dp/da <0). Within
the limit entry set, better coordinated entry induced by a higher a is also beneficial for the
incumbent because she prefers to have an accommodated duopoly situation rather than a
contested monopoly (the expression in the curly bracket in Eq.(21) is negative when a e i ) .
29Technically, the set of continuous-time equilibria is not the set of limit points of discrete-time equilibria.
30We can also verify that W is a concave function of a (d2 W/da2<0).
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Second, given the probability of coordination failure, a higher a translates into a higher
probability of maintaining the monopoly position through litigation.
We can also show that as a—KX2*+, the cost of a mistake becomes closer to zero,
inducing each potential entrant to enter almost surely in each period (p-»l). As a result,
the probability of coordination failure also approaches one (p -> 1) with the expected
payoff of the incumbent being [aITM +(l-a)nT]/r. We can conclude that due to a change
in the nature of entry dynamics (infinite delay vs. immediate entry), the expected payoff of
the incumbent jumps down discontinuously at the left boundary point of the limit entry set
as depicted in Figure 3. In contrast, at the right boundary point of the limit entry set, the
payoff jumps up to the monopoly profit level as the credibility of patent litigation is
restored and entry is blockaded.
We note that 04* —HX2*+ as A —»0, which allows us to suppress the subscripts
hereafter. Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium in the infinite-horizon continuous
framework.
Proposition 2. Suppose that there exists a limit entry set I = [a*, a**]. (i)Ifa<a*,
there is delay in the first entry, the timing of which is distributed exponentially with
parameter 2X, where X = . The incumbent brings an infringement suit in
aF
face of the first entrant. Depending on the outcome of the suit, there may be a further
entry; firm 2 enters if and only if the patent is held invalid, (ii) If a e I = [a*, a**], there
is an immediate entry. If there is only one entrant, the incumbent accommodates the
entry and there is no further entry. If both enter at the same time, the incumbent brings
infringement suits, (iii) if a >a**, there is no entry. If there were one, there would be
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Figure 3 - The Expected Pavoffs of the Incumbent and Entrants as Functions of a.
One important consequence of this observation is that the strengthening of
intellectual property rights (captured as an increase in a) is not necessarily desirable for
the patentholder. This implies that government policies designed to encourage R&D
investment by providing better protection for the innovator may have the opposite effect
of retarding the speed of initial innovation.
The result is reminiscent of those of Bernheim (1984) and Benoit (1985).31 In a
model of sequential entry, Bernheim (1984) demonstrates that the qualitative nature of
the entry deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms is much different from the
single entrant case. One implication of his analysis is that the sequential aspects of entry
deterrence makes it possible for government policies designed to promote entry to have
the opposite effect of increasing industrial concentration. The reason is that the
profitability of potential entrants is in turn determined in part by the ease with which future
entrants can be deterred.
The nonmonotonicity of comparative statics result in both Bernheim's (1984) and
my paper rely on the existence of multiple potential entrants. Despite the similarities in
this regard, there are also some crucial differences between the two papers. First of all,
Bernheim's (1984) model is devoid of any intertemporal aspects. His concern is with the
equilibrium number of firms (industrial concentration) associated with the zero profit entry
condition prevailing under various entry-deterrent strategies. In contrast, my model has
bite only when intertemporal aspects are considered: the driving force behind the
nonmonotonicity result is the endogenized timing of entry in the form of an incentive to
free-ride on information revealed by the rival firm's entry or to preempt the rival firm.
Second, potential entrants in Bernheim's model are symmetric in any ex post entry
configurations, whereas potential entrants in my model can have asymmetric payoffs ex
post when the initial entry has a preemptive nature or reveals new information regarding
the validity of the patent.
Benoit (1985) is closer to this paper in that the effect of imitation on the innovator
is generated through endogenized entry timing of the imitator. In his paper, there is
uncertainty surrounding the profitability of innovation, which is revealed only over time.
31
 It is also worth mentioning a recent paper by Helpman (1993) which analyzes the enforcement of
intellectual property rights in a dynamic general equilibrium framework of international trade in which
the North invents new products and the South imitates them. In his model, tightening of intellectual
property rights can hurt the North due to the effect of reallocation of production. When the initial rate of
imitation is sufficiently low, the loss from this effect outweighs the gains from the terms of trade effect.
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This creates an option value of waiting for the imitator; even though the waiting strategy
entails the loss of temporary profits in the event the innovation is favorable, it can save on
a would-be failed investment.32 The difference is that a new flow of information arrives
exogenously in Benoit's model, whereas here new information is created endogenously
only when an action is taken by one of the parties concerned. In this respect, the delayed
entry in my model is due to the strategic option value of waiting which is nonexistent in
Benoit's model of a single entrant.33
Finally, my analysis has an important ramification for the interpretation of empirical
data on imitation. Mansfield et ai (1981), for instance, estimate that about 60 percent of
the patented innovations in their sample were imitated within four years. The analysis of
Mansfield et al. (1981) is based on the (implicit) premise that the imitation process in itself
is a race among potential imitators. My analysis suggests caution in interpreting empirical
data on imitation times; the data can overestimate the difficulty of imitation since the time
lag may contain a strategic waiting component.
IV. Concluding Remarks
I have developed a simple model of imitation with multiple entrants. The basic
premise of the paper is that an initial imitation attempt and its accompanying patent
infringement suit can serve as an information transmission mechanism in that other
potential entrants can condition their own entry decisions on the information revealed in
the process of patent suit. This informational externality can induce each potential entrant
to wait for the other to take the initiative. However, this is not the only possibility.
There are also cases where the so-called "limit entry set (I)" exists. In these cases, if a s i ,
the first entrant is accommodated whereas further entry is deterred. As a result, the entry
32Benoit's model also predicts the nonmonotonicity of innovator's profit in relevant parameters (cost of
innovation and probability of success) if imitation is possible.
33Another difference is that Benoit (1985) considers nonpatentable innovations, whereas the information
revelational role of patent suit in my paper applies to patentable innovations.
dynamics is that of a preemption game in which each one strives to be the first entrant.
This implies that as the parameter a changes and crosses the boundary of the set i, the
imitation game undergoes a fundamental change in the nature of entry dynamics. In fact,
it was demonstrated that the expected payoff of the incumbent jumps down
discontinuously at the left boundary point of/ as the imitation game is converted from one
of waiting to one of preemption; the timing of entry changes from infinite delay to
immediate entry. Implications for the interpretation of empirical data on imitation were
also discussed.
The model adds an important dimension to the innovation literature by considering
the litigation process in the enforcement of patents. However, the model abstracts from
many important details of reality, leaving many questions unanswered. I conclude by
mentioning several avenues along which the current analysis can be extended.
First of all, I have assumed that there is only one way to design around the
patented invention. Realistically, there are many ways to "invent around" with associated
probabilities of infringement. The Trade-off facing the imitator will be between a lower
probability of infringement vs. a higher cost of inventing around in the choice of imitative
research strategy. In other words, the probability of infringement can be reduced by
spending more on searching for less obvious ways of inventing around. I can think of the
imitators' strategy as a choice of infringement probability. In this case, imitation efforts
can create another public good since the benefit of successful imitation is shared by
everyone else while the cost is borne by the first imitator. From the perspectives of
potential imitators as a team, the noncooperative equilibrium choice of infringement
probability will be suboptimally high.
A more serious deficiency of the current paper is that it does not allow the
possibility of the out-of-court settlement between the patentee and the accused infringer.
In fact, a large proportion of infringement suits are settled out of court in the form of
licensing (White and Jacob, 1986). An important question in this case is what kind of
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informational implications the out-of-court settlement entails. We expect that the extent
of information transmission is greater through trials than through the out-of-court
settlement since the latter deprives other potential entrants of the opportunity to uncover
critical information regarding the profitability of their own entry [Che and Yi (1990)].34 If
there is private information held by either disputing party regarding the validity of the
patent, litigation behavior in court can have signaling value and potentially influence the
terms of licensing as predatory behavior of the incumbent can affect the terms of merger
with the entrant [Saloner (1987), Meurer (1989)].35 Another discrepancy with reality is
that we have assumed a timeless trial. However, protracted legal battles can be
strategically used by the incumbent to retard the speed of further entry. On-going
uncertainty about the outcome of litigation can leave other potential imitators' entry
decisions in limbo, thereby allowing the incumbent extra time to come down along the
learning curve.36
Finally, my analysis has been limited to the pasf-innovation incentive to imitate. It
is important to embed the analysis in the overall innovation game. For instance, it is not
an unreasonable assumption that the participation in the race can reduce the cost of
imitation when the innovation race is lost. Then, the progress made by the losers in the
innovation race can position them asymmetrically as potential imitators in the imitation
game. A full analysis of this possibility awaits future research. I believe, however, that
none of the extensions mentioned above will alter the basic intuition of the paper.
34Friendly settlement of law suits between rivals may induce inherently invalid patents to remain in effect
to the date of expiration, resulting in restraint of trade.
35Burns (1986) estimates that predatory pricing significantly reduced the acquisition costs of American
Tobacco Company both for victims of predation and, through reputation effects, for competitors who sold
peacefully.
36Levin et al (1987) report that the effectiveness of lead time and learning curve advantages was
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